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Abstract 
This paper discusses the evolution of the accounts receivable confirmations from the early 20
th
 
century to the present, followed by types of confirmation and why the format and process of 
obtaining accounts receivable confirmations cannot minimize problems associated with them. 
This paper offers a new approach, Auditor-to-Auditor Confirmations (ATAC) and discusses how 
the process of obtaining accounts receivable confirmations can be strengthened using this new 
approach. This technique would have auditor confirm balances with the client customer’s auditor 
if the customer employs an independent auditor. This new approach will reduce management 
manipulation and other problems associated with obtaining accounts receivable confirmations 
under current format.  An investigation of perception of senior accounting students indicate that 
they believe the new ATAC is more effective and reliable than other methods of accounts 
receivable confirmations. Types of accounts receivable fraud and how ATAC can reduce such 
frauds are also discussed in the paper.   
 
Keywords: Accounts Receivable Confirmation, Paper Confirmation, Electronic Confirmation, 
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Auditor-to-Auditor Confirmations: A New Approach in Obtaining 
Accounts Receivable Confirmation and Its Empirical Investigation 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Barry Minkow, owner of ZZZZ Best and one of the most recognized financial swindlers 
in the 1980s, made the following statement during a private, prison tape interview (Wells 2001, 
para. 7): 
Accounts receivable are a wonderful thing for a fraudster like me. They 
immediately increase profits. But they also do something else—they explain why 
my company doesn’t have any cash; it’s all tied up in accounts receivable. 
  
Managements has frequently used accounts receivable as fraudulent financial reporting 
since they provide many benefits for fraudsters, including increase in sales and profits, increase 
in current assets and total assets, and use as collateral for getting loans. Because of high potential 
for fraudulent financial reporting, auditors are highly concerned with the existence of accounts 
receivables. For existence assertion, auditors commonly examine the accounts receivable 
confirmations. As Caster et al. (2008, 253) note, “[c]onfirmations are considered to be among the 
most persuasive forms of audit evidence, because they are received directly from a third party.” 
But the collusion between management and the confirmees, as well as management manipulation 
of confirmation process could significantly reduce the usefulness of this type of evidence.  
Therefore, auditors may be placing too much reliance on accounts receivable confirmations on 
the ground that they are provided by outside third parties. In this paper, I suggest a new approach 
in obtaining accounts receivable confirmations; what could be called Auditor-to-Auditor 
Confirmations (ATAC). 
This paper begins with a discussion of the evolution of the accounts receivable 
confirmations from the early 20
th
 century to the present. The following section presents types of 
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confirmation processes and discusses why the current format of obtaining accounts receivable 
confirmations cannot minimize problems associated with them. The third section discusses how 
the process of obtaining accounts receivable confirmations can be strengthened and suggests a 
new approach, auditor-to-auditor confirmations, to improve its use in the future to reduce 
management manipulation and other problems. The fourth section presents the perception of 
senior accounting students with regard to the use of different types of accounts receivable. Types 
of accounts receivable fraud and how ATAC can reduce such frauds are discussed in the fourth 
section. Finally, the paper presents the conclusion and limitations of the study.  
 
1. Accounts Receivable Confirmations During 20
th
 Century and Early 21
st
 Century  
Prior to 1939, accounts receivable confirmations were not widely used except in the 
brokerage and banking industries (Peloubet 1939). Auditors performed basic tests of accounts 
receivables with attentions paid to defalcations. For example, Moussalli, Gray, and Karahan 
(2011) refer to Montgomery auditing book (1915, 72), stating “An old item in a running account 
or a bill partly paid, followed by others fully paid, usually means that an allowance has been or 
will be made, or that a defalcation exists.” Therefore, accounts receivable concerns at that time 
were mainly misappropriation of assets or employee fraud rather than fraudulent financial 
reporting or management fraud. This mainly changed with the Ultramares Corporation v. 
Touche, Niven & Company (1931) case. 
Ultramares had loaned money to Fred Stern & Company, a rubber importing company, in 
1924 on the basis of financial statements prepared by Touche, Niven & Co. Touche audited the 
books of Fred Stern & Co. and issued a clean report and furnished their client company with 
roughly 32 copies of the report to be reissued to the investors, creditors, and other users. The 
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report certified a net worth of over $1 million, even though the company was in fact insolvent 
and had debts of over $200,000 in excess of its assets. The assets were overstated by $950,000 
through fictitious accounts receivables. Subsequently, in 1925, Fred Stern & Company filed for 
bankruptcy and Ultramares, a third-party user of these financial statements, filed a court 
complaint. A lower court found Touche guilty of negligence, but the firm was declared not liable 
to Ultramares because there was no privity of contract between the auditor and Ultramares. In 
1931, seven years and several court appearances and appeals later, the New York Court of 
Appeals ruled on the case and agreed that third parties could not hold an auditor liable for 
ordinary negligence, only for fraud. 
In 1936, the American Institute’s 1917 joint pronouncement with the Federal Trade 
Commission on auditing standards was revised and recommended that auditors observe 
inventories and confirm receivables. The 1936 revision suggested, but did not require, the taking 
of physical inventory and direct mail confirmation of accounts receivables (Chatfield 1974).  
The auditing profession had just started to implement the guidance in the revised version 
bulletin when the McKesson & Robbins fraud surfaced (Carmichael and Winters 1982). Philip 
Coster, the president of McKesson & Robbins, Inc., a large drug company, had embezzled funds 
from the company along with his three brothers. “The senior management of McKesson & 
Robbins had used a facade of false documents to conceal the fact that $19 million in inventory 
and receivables were nonexistent (Cangemi and Singlton 2003, 8-9).  The scheme was to inflate 
the reported value of the assets while skimming cash into their own pockets. As it turned out, 
fictitious inventories and accounts receivable made up more than 20 percent of the company’s 
reported assets.  
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A Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) investigation of the matter concluded that 
while Price Waterhouse and Company conducted their audit to what was considered acceptable
1
; 
they did not demonstrate the due diligence that the job required. The findings also stated that 
“…time had long passed when an audit was restricted to the books and records; the facts should 
be confirmed by physical inspection or independent confirmation (Baxter 1999, 172).” As a 
result, the American Institute of Accountants (AIA) appointed a committee to study the 1936 
revised bulletin and make recommendation for changes. In 1939, AIA issued Statement on 
Auditing Procedures (SAP) No. 1 “Extensions of Auditing Procedures” that required auditors to 
observe inventories and confirm receivables. “The subsequent requirements for the use of 
accounts receivable confirmations were issued based on the belief that if the McKesson-Robbins 
auditors had sent confirmation requests, they likely would have discovered the fictitious accounts 
receivable (Caster, Elder, and Janvrin 2008, 256).” Despite requirement for confirmations since 
1939, accounts receivable frauds continue to occur similar to McKesson-Robbins, such as Equity 
Funding, or more recent examples such as Royal Ahold (AAER No. 2124, 2004).  
In 1964, managers at Equity Funding Corporation of America used a series of frauds to 
show false profits, thus increasing the company’s stock price. One of the fraud schemes was a 
deceptive tactic during confirmation of receivables. According to Cangemi and Singlton (2003, 
19):  
When the external auditing firm tried to confirm receivables (policies) by phone, 
the Equity Funding switchboard operator simply patched them through to Equity 
Funding (EF) employees in the building. That is, EF employees were in on the 
fraud and actually provided external auditors with false information. The most 
amazing fact of the case is that it went undetected for so long. Many people inside 
the company knew about the fraud, and yet the fraud was a better-kept secret than 
some of our military secrets of the time. The fraud was exposed when a 
disgruntled ex-employee blew the whistle. 
                                                             
1 While Price Waterhouse and Company did not question the existence of numerous new customers over the 
previous fiscal year, they were compliant with the standards at the time. 
 
 
5 
 
 
 
In 1988, Harold Ruttenberg opened the first Just For Feet, a large free standing store with 
a basketball court and a “combat zone”, where shoes were sold at discount prices. In 1992, Just 
For Feet (JFF) purchased two small mall based athletic shoe chains, Athletic Attic and Imperial 
Sports. In 1994, the company went public. In 1997 and 1998, Just For Feet used just about all 
areas to create fictitious income and assets. The company even had a Nike employee (supplier) to 
confirm fictitious amounts to the auditors. Part of the fraudulent activities was related to 
fictitious receivables. Just for Feet routinely recorded anticipated vendor allowances as 
receivables. The vendor allowances increased from $400,000 at the end of 1997 to 29 million 
dollars at the end of 1998. In order to confirm the receivables, Ruttenberg used his influence to 
persuade executives to return false confirmations.  
A more contemporary example, the Dutch company Royal Ahold, NV (Ahold) acquired 
U.S. Foodservice in 2000. U.S. Foodservice was the second-largest distributor of food and 
Ahold’s exclusive chains of U.S. grocery stores. According to Sanchez and Agoglia (2011, 238), 
“a material portion of U.S. Foodservice’s balance sheet was promotional allowances receivable 
from vendors (vendor rebates). As part of their normal audit procedures for U.S. Foodservice, 
Ahold’s independent auditors Deloitte and Touche sent confirmations for these receivables.” 
However, third party confirmations of rebates receivable had been provided by the vendors’ 
salespeople, not their accounting departments. Sanchez and Agolia (2011, 242) further note that: 
 
According to complaints filed by the SEC, employees at U.S. Foodservice urged 
their vendors to complete and return to the auditors false confirmation letters with 
dollar amounts intentionally overstated, sometimes by as much as millions of 
dollars. Some vendors were pressured, some were provided with secret “side 
letters” assuring the vendors that they did not owe the amounts listed on the 
confirmations (Securities and Exchange Commission, 2006). 
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During the second half of the 20
th
 century, the belief was that confirmations of accounts 
receivable are for authentication process and not detecting fraud. For example, Moussalli et al. 
(2011, 81) note that, in Montgomery 1975 book (Defliese, Johnson, and Macleod 1975), the 
“section on confirmation of accounts receivable declares that ‘the purpose of those procedures is 
not so much to protect against possible fraud on the part of the client (although that possibility is 
clearly implied) as to preserve the integrity of the confirmation procedure as a valid proof of 
authenticity (250).’” 
This is also evident from adopting SAS No. 67, when two Board members (out of the 
seventeen), while affirming the Statement, expressed a reservation that the language used in the 
Statement usurped the freedom of the auditor in exercising professional judgment in how best to 
confirm accounts receivable. In addition, they expressed concerns that the language might also 
lead auditors to place undue reliance on third party confirmation when circumstances might 
suggest that the auditor choose a more effective test (AICPA 1991). As Sanchez and Agogila 
(2011, 246) note: 
With the benefit of hindsight it is clear that the auditors of U.S. Foodservice could 
have, and should have, designed a more “effective test,” one that would have 
helped overcome the inherent weakness that existed in this situation where parties 
providing the confirmation may have either been uninformed about the existence 
and/or amount owed to the retailer or may have had a vested interest to overstate 
the amount that was owed to U.S. Foodservice. 
 
These fraudulent schemes related to confirmations of accounts receivable clearly show 
that the process has not been properly working during the 20
th
 century. In early 21
st
 century, the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, commonly referred to as SOX, established the Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board (PCAOB), which is overseen by the SEC. The PCAOB’s purpose is to oversee, 
regulate, inspect, and discipline the accounting firms for their roles as auditors of all public 
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companies. The PCAOB has issued a variety of Auditing Standards to improve audits of public 
companies, including Concept Release on Possible Revisions to the PCAOB’s Standard on Audit 
Confirmation on April 14, 2009 (PCAOB Release No. 2009-02). The concept release attempted 
to strengthen the confirmation process due to advances in technologies and other deficiencies 
embedded in the previous professional standards. As of writing of this paper, PCAOB still relies 
on AU 330 as an interim standard for external confirmation process. 
TYPES OF CONFIRMATIONS 
 Two types of accounts receivable confirmations are used by the auditors, positive or 
negative confirmations. The positive confirmation requires a response by the customer and could 
take several forms: blank, information provided, and individual invoice confirmations. Blank 
forms request the recipient to fill in the balance or furnish other information without stating the 
amount (or other information) on the confirmation request (SAS, AU330, para.17) AICPA. 
Information provided forms request the respondent to confirm whether s/he agrees with accounts 
balance or the information stated on the request. Finally, the individual invoice form provides 
details of the invoices in place of accounts receivable balance. Each of these positive forms of 
confirmations has its own advantages and disadvantages. Blank form is the most reliable form of 
accounts receivable confirmation but has lower response rate. Individual invoice and information 
provided forms are less reliable but provide higher response rate. The literature on the response 
rate of the later two positive forms, i.e., confirming individual invoices in year-end accounts 
receivable rather than entire year-end account balance, is inconclusive. While Krogstad and 
Romney (1980) found individual invoice confirmations improved confirmation reliability, 
effectiveness, and response rate, Ashton and Hylas (1981) as well as Allen and Elder (2001) did 
not report any increase in response rates or effectiveness for invoice confirmation requests over 
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balance confirmation requests. 
 The negative accounts receivable confirmation form is formatted similar to the positive 
confirmation form. The only difference is that it requires a response from the customer only if 
the customer does not agree with the balance. In view of that, the use of negative confirmation 
requests generally provides less reliable evidence than positive confirmations. Existing guidance 
in SAS No. 67 indicates that negative confirmations may be used when: (1) the combined 
assessed level of inherent and control risk is low, (2) a large number of small balances are 
involved, and (3) the auditor believes that the recipients of the requests are likely to give the 
request adequate consideration. International Standard on Auditing (ISA) 505 (IFAC 2008), 
paragraph 15, provides similar guidance and states that negative confirmation requests may be 
used to reduce the risk of material misstatement to an acceptable level when: (a) the auditor has 
assessed the risk of material misstatement as low, (b) a large number of small, homogeneous 
balances, transactions or conditions comprise the accounts receivable balance, (c) expectation of 
exception rate is very low, and (d) the auditor has no reason to believe that the respondents will 
disregard the requests. The two definitions are essentially the same.   
 The use of positive confirmation is preferred when the individual account balances are 
relatively large, or where the entity’s internal controls are not working efficiently. A response to 
a positive confirmation request is ordinarily expected to provide reliable evidence to the auditor. 
A no response to positive confirmation suggests the auditor should send a reminder to the third 
party or do alternative procedures. Both ISA 505 (IFAC 2008) and AICPA Practice Alert 2003-
01 (AICPA 2007) indicate that a combination of positive and negative confirmations can be 
used. According to Caster et al. (2008): 
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The evidence indicates that detection rates for negative confirmations are 
generally statistically significantly lower than those for positive confirmations. 
The detection rate for positive confirmations is also quite low. Warren (1974) 
noted that negative confirmations are the least informative, but they are also the 
least costly. 
One important requirement for accounts receivable confirmation is that the auditor should 
maintain control over the whole process of confirmation requests, including (1) information to be 
confirmed or requested, (2) selection of confirming party, (3) mailing the requests, including 
follow-up requests when applicable, to the confirming party, and (4) requests are properly 
addressed and contain return information for responses to be sent directly to the auditor [see ISA 
505, para. 7 (IFAC 2008)]. The professional standards also require that the auditor documents 
and justifies the reasons if no confirmations are being sent for accounts receivables. However, 
based on a comprehensive review literature, Caster et al. (2008) reported that some auditors do 
not confirm accounts receivable with proper documentation and do not submit proper 
documentation justifying the decision not to send confirmation as required under Statement on 
Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 67 (AICPA 1991).  
One major problem with accounts receivable confirmations is collusion between auditee 
management and their customers, which limits the usefulness of confirmations to provide 
support for existence assertion. Based on a review of cases in Accounting and Auditing 
Enforcement Releases (AAERs), Caster et al. (2008) report that management can persuade their 
customers to sign and return false confirmations and even pay customers to reply to the false 
confirmations. In addition, there were instances where auditee personnel responded to the 
confirmations with the forged signature of the customer. 
In addition, many auditors fail to perform due diligence in the confirmation process. They 
rely heavily on the information provided by the management including contact information, 
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where confirmations to be sent, and what information to be confirmed. These problems, 
alongside management collusion with the third parties, makes it very difficult for the auditor to 
guarantee accuracy surrounding the accounts receivable confirmations as evidence of existence 
assertions related to accounts receivables. 
 
STRENGTHENING CONFIRMATION PROCESS FOR ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE 
The recent SEC investigation into China Century Dragon Media, Inc. (CDM) shows why 
audit confirmations play an important role on the financial audit process.  “It also supports recent 
decisions by the Auditing Standards Board (ASB), the Public Company Accounting Oversight 
Board (PCAOB) and the International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) to 
update and strengthen their standards related to external audit confirmations (confirmation.com 
2011, para. 1).” 
CDM launched its initial public offering (IPO) on February 8 of 2011. Just six weeks 
after, “the New York Stock Exchange notified the company that its common stock was being 
delisted due to non-compliance with the exchange's listing standards (confirmation.com, 2011, 
para. 2).” The decision was made based on resignation of MaloneBailey LLP (MB), China 
Century's independent accounting firm, from its engagement with the company because of 
discrepancies found on customer confirmations and the auditor's inability to directly verify China 
Century's bank records (confirmation.com 2011, para. 2).  
While management manipulates the confirmation process, oftentimes auditors also fail to 
follow the due diligence in obtaining accounts receivable confirmations. Both SAS No. 67 and 
ISA No. 505 require that the auditor: 
 Use direct communication with the third party. 
 Exercise professional skepticism. 
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 Make sure Respondent is free from bias.  
 Maintain control in the confirmation process. 
“Unfortunately, many auditors fail to follow the proper confirmation procedures and 
simply believe that receiving a signed response to a confirmation request provides them the 
proper audit evidence needed for the audit (Capital Confirmation, Inc.
2
 2010, p.7).”  According 
to Capital Confirmation Inc. (2010), the problem is exacerbated because: 
 Client provides false contact information, 
 Client provides the contact name, 
 Client influences the confirmation process, and 
 Auditor cannot authenticate signature verification of the confirmee. 
A recent SEC investigation of PW India (an affiliates of PricewaterhouseCoopers) shows 
that this is exactly the case. The SEC’s investigation (SEC 2011, para. 8) found that: 
PW India staff failed to conduct procedures to confirm Satyam’s cash and cash 
equivalent balances or its accounts receivables. Specifically, the order found that 
PW India’s “failure to properly execute third-party confirmation procedures 
resulted in the fraud at Satyam going undetected” for years. PW India’s failures in 
auditing Satyam “were indicative of a quality control failure throughout PW 
India” because PW India staff “routinely relinquished control of the delivery and 
receipt of cash confirmations entirely to their audit clients and rarely, if ever, 
questioned the integrity of the confirmation responses they received from the 
client by following up with the banks.” 
The audit profession’s failure to perform due diligence in the confirmation process shows 
that CDM’s case along with other recent accounts receivable confirmation fraudulent schemes 
such as Kmart are not isolated confirmation frauds. In response to these scandals and problems, 
the ASB and the IAASB have issued new standards in the last few years that now allow for 
secure electronic audit confirmations (confirmation.com 2011, para. 6). It is hoped that this new 
                                                             
2 Capital Confirmation Inc. is the same entity as Confirmation.com. 
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procedure would help auditors more easily detect financial frauds involving audit confirmation 
irregularities.   
While the automation process may alleviate some of the problems in the confirmation 
process, it cannot not entirely eliminate collusion between management and the third party. In 
addition, it may create other problems related to automation and information technologies such 
as receiving email responses from fake confirmees. A better solution would be to allow auditors 
to communicate with each other with regard to accounts receivable confirmations (auditor-to- 
auditor confirmation or ATAC). The idea here is the practitioner asks the auditor of the client’s 
customer to confirm the balance owed by the customer to the client if customer employs an 
independent accountant to audit its financial statements. Advantages of the auditor-to-auditor 
confirmations are increase in the response rate for positive confirmation, higher reliability for 
negative confirmation, authentication of confirmations, and increased effectiveness of 
confirmations. 
Opponents of this idea may claim several problems with this procedure, including 
confidentiality of information, impracticality, and costs. Confidentiality of information is most 
likely the major road block in this process. I, however, argue that when the public good is at 
stake, the rules can be amended to allow confidential information to be released, especially when 
it does not harm the company. This has been done in other areas. For example, Congress 
included provisions in the Sarbane-Oxley Act of 2002 directing the SEC to issue rules requiring 
attorneys serving public companies to report material violations by the company of federal 
securities laws. Consequently, The American Bar Association amended its attorney-client 
confidentiality rules to permit attorneys to breach confidentiality if a client is committing a crime 
or fraud. The same can be done by the PCAOB, AICPA, and IFAC with regard to accounts 
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receivable confirmations where professional standards related to confidentiality can be amended 
so that auditors can communicate with regard to accounts receivable confirmations. 
Impracticality deals with timing of financial statements. For example, while the client’s 
year-end may be December 31, the customer year-end could be other dates but December 31. 
Therefore, the auditor of the customer may not have the audited balance of accounts payable on 
December 31 to confirm it to the client’s auditor. Although this poses some problems in the 
process, I still believe the balance of unaudited accounts payable confirmed by the customer’s 
auditor is more reliable than a confirmation by the customer, which may misrepresent the 
accounts payable balance on the confirmation without manipulating the accounts payable 
balance. Direct confirmation from the customer’s auditor to the client’s auditor would require the 
customer also record fictitious journal entries in its books should they decide to collude with the 
client’s management. This will create problem in the customer’s internal control system and 
therefore, it is less likely to be implemented. 
Finally, the costs involved in this process will need to be reviewed. Since auditors will 
need to perform additional work to respond to these confirmations and possibly to assist in 
resolving the differences, the question becomes who should bear the costs. Will costs be 
absorbed by the client or the customer of the client? I argue that the benefits of implementing this 
process include both the client and its customers. Therefore, the costs should be absorbed by 
both. Auditors can incorporate in their fees an amount for such a service. Additionally, with 
technological advancements similar to ACH that banking system uses3, the cost would most 
likely be minimal and, when it is for public good, the benefits overweight the costs. 
 
                                                             
3 The Automated Clearing House (ACH) system is used by banks to transfer money. In addition to being faster than 
most other transfer options, the ACH is more secure.  
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EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION OF ATAC EFFECTIVENESS AND RELIABILITY 
This study uses senior accounting students at a liberal-art college in the Northeast of the 
United States of America to examine the effectiveness and reliability of three methods of 
accounts receivable confirmations: paper, electronic, and auditor to auditor. As part of the 
learning effect related to confirmation of accounts receivable, surveys were distributed to 67 
students taking the auditing course in Fall 2017 (see Appendix A). Prior to the administration of 
the survey, the course covered audits of accounts receivable and process of obtaining accounts 
receivable confirmation. In addition, students performed an electronic accounts confirmation 
project through confirmation.com website.  Students responded to eight statements, on a rating 
scale of 1(very low) through 7(very high), to rate various aspects of accounts receivable 
confirmation for the three methods. For example, the first question was "Response rate to 
positive accounts receivable confirmation" with three options of Paper Audit Confirmation 
(PAC), Electronic Audit Confirmation (EAC), and Auditor-to-Auditor Confirmation (ATAC).  
 Of 67 surveys distributed, one was deleted as the students responded 7 to all questions. 
Of 66 students for the study, 35 were male and 31 were female with average age of 22 years. In 
addition, at the time of this survey, 65 percent of students had accepted offers from public 
accounting firms (30 percent Big-4 and 30 percent reginal firms), five percent from industry, and 
the remaining had not received an offer. 
 A Friedman test was run to determine if there were differences in responses to the three 
types of obtaining accounts receivable confirmations PAC, EAC, and ATAC. Pairwise 
comparisons were performed with a Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons. The results 
are presented in Table 1. 
[insert Table 1 about here] 
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As Table 1 shows, students believed that there are significant differences among the three 
methods of accounts receivable (A/R) confirmation with regard to response rate (χ2= 33.445, 
p=.000), authentication of A/R confirmation (χ2= 11.598, p=.003), efficiency of the audit of A/R 
confirmation (χ2= 33.954, p=.000), effectiveness of the audit of A/R confirmation (χ2= 8.373, 
p=.015), reliability of negative confirmation for A/R (χ2= 8.373, p=.015), cost to implement (χ2= 
16.217, p=.000), and practicality to implement (χ2= 16.300, p=.000). Students perceived no 
significant difference among the three methods for the amount of alternative procedures needed 
when responses to positive A/R confirmation are not received. Post hoc analyses, as shown on 
Table 2, were performed on each of the eight statements to investigate where differences exist. 
[insert Table 2 about here] 
Compare to paper A/R confirmation, the results in Table 2 indicate that students 
perceived electronic A/R confirmation provides higher response rates (p < .001), efficiency 
(p<.001), and practicality to implement (p<.05). In addition, students believed electronic A/R 
confirmation is less costly than paper A/R confirmation (p<.05). 
Compare to paper A/R confirmation, the results in Table 2 also indicate that students 
perceived auditor-to-auditor A/R confirmation provides higher response rates (p < .001), 
efficiency (p<.001), effectiveness (p<.10), and reliability (P<.10). Furthermore, while students 
perceived that auditor-to-auditor A/R confirmation provide better authentication than electronic 
A/R confirmation (p<.05), they believed that electronic A/R confirmation was less costly but 
more practical than auditor-to-auditor A/R confirmation. 
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Overall, the findings from senior accounting students indicate that ATAC is superior to 
PAC in response rate, efficiency, effectiveness, and reliability. In addition, although ATAC 
could be costly and less practical than EAC, students perceived ATAC provides a more authentic 
A/R confirmation than EAC. It has been the poor or lack of authentication of A/R confirmation 
in the past that has resulted in fraudulent overstatement of A/R by companies. Therefore, ATAC 
seems to be a good substitute for PAC and EAC. 
In the following section I will discuss different types of accounts receivable fraud 
schemes and explain how direct auditor-to-auditor confirmations of accounts receivable can 
prevent these types of fraud. 
 
TYPES OF ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE FRAUD 
Several methods are used to overstate accounts receivable and the corresponding sales. 
These include  
 Improper treatment of sales (e.g., fictitious sales). 
 Holding books open past close of period. 
 Billing and holding schemes. 
 Conditional sales (return after year-end).  
 Channel Stuffing. 
 Delayed posting of sales returns. 
 
Improper treatment of sales happens when management creates fictitious sales to existing 
or fake customers. Since no cash is actually collected when a sale on account has been made, it 
leaves an opportunity for a dishonest management to record “fraudulent additional sales by 
simply creating fictitious customers and recording fictitious sales” (Elmaleh 2006, para. 2). A 
recent example is when WorldCom’s Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Bernard Ebbers, persuaded 
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the Chief Operating Officer (COO), Ron Beaumont, to find and record one-time revenue items 
that were fictitious (Blumenstein and Pulliam 2003). The fictitious entry was booked to the 
Uncollected Revenue Account and increased WorldCom’s revenue. These fictitious entries were 
significant and round numbers (Beresford, Katzenbach, and Rogers, Jr.  2003). In other words, 
the fictitious journal entry was debited to the allowance for doubtful accounts with the 
corresponding revenue account. These types of manipulations would not be discovered by the 
accounts receivable confirmations because it deals with valuation assertion rather than existence 
assertion. Other auditing procedures could have uncovered this manipulation, though they will 
not be discussed in this paper. Nonetheless, if fictitious revenue entries are directly made to the 
accounts receivable, a confirmation received from the customer’s auditor most likely will 
uncover the fraud unless the customer also makes a fictitious journal entry into its accounts 
payable which is unlikely to happen. 
Another popular method for inflating accounts receivable is “keeping the books open” at 
the end of the accounting period” (Elmaleh, 2006 para. 3). In this method, the corporation has 
real customers and sales but the sales made for the next period are recorded as part of sales for 
the period under the audit, which will cause overstatements of accounts receivable and revenues 
for the year under audit. The auditor-to-auditor confirmation should discover this type of 
overstatement of accounts receivable and revenue. That is, since the customer records the sales in 
the next period, its accounts payable do not correspond to the accounts receivable of the client at 
the financial statement date and this will be reflected in the confirmation received. 
Under billing and holding scheme, the management creates receivables but holds the 
goods for later shipment, or does not ship the goods at all. This scheme is often used with large 
customers. Sometimes bill-and-hold schemes are the product of collusion between a seller and a 
 
 
18 
 
customer, whereby the seller requests that the customer orders additional goods before year-end, 
and books the sale in order to achieve a target sales level. The goods remain with the seller, and 
are not shipped until the subsequent period. In exchange for placing the order, the seller offers 
the customer the goods at a reduced cost. An example of a bill-and-hold scheme in recent years 
occurred at Sunbeam, where in 1998, Sunbeam CEO, Al Dunlap used a bill-and-hold strategy in 
order to make Sunbeam's financial performance better than it really was by artificially 
inflating Sun Beam's revenue by 18%. Management overstated revenues by some $95 million 
and net profits by $71 million (Zweighaft 2003). While there are other procedures to examine 
whether bill-and-holding scheme is affecting the financial statements (see Zweighaft 2003 for the 
procedures to uncover bill-and-holding schemes), if bill-and-holding schemes are recorded to the 
accounts receivable, a confirmation received from the customer’s auditor most likely will 
uncover the fraud unless the customer also makes a fictitious journal entry into its accounts 
payable which is unlikely to happen. 
Conditional sales involve sales to customers with the condition of returns after the year-
end to overstate the revenue and accounts receivables in the current period. A recent example is 
Coca-Cola’s conditional sales by coercing its biggest distributors to accept delivery of more 
syrup than they needed at the end of each quarter, thus inflating revenue by about $10 million a 
year (Lovel 2003). Since conditional sales are generally done by coercing customers to accept 
the sales and return the goods later, it is difficult to be detected through accounts receivable 
confirmation process. However, auditor-to-auditor confirmation may request the customer’s 
auditor to look for any material return of merchandize in the next period and report it to the 
client’s auditor. 
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Channel stuffing is another form of conditional sales which involves shipping 
substantially more inventory to a reseller than he can reasonably use, but agrees to accept it 
based on unusual or extraordinary terms, like extended payment terms, deep discounts, or 
allowing the return of unsold goods for full credit beyond the company’s normal returns policy. 
Two recent cases of channel stuffing include Bristol-Myers and Lucent Technologies. In the 
Bristol-Myers case, 2001 revenues were inflated by as much as $1.5 billion by providing sales 
incentives to wholesalers who would make the delivery of the product without intent to sell the 
products until the following year (Patsuris 2002). Lucent Technologies improperly booked $678 
million in revenues during 2000 of which $452 million reflected products sent to its distribution 
partners that were never actually sold to the end customers (Pellegrini 2001). While auditor-to-
auditor confirmation may not directly uncover channel stuffing schemes, it may provide the 
customer’s auditor with adequate information to check for channel stuffing sales if individual 
invoices are provided in confirmations. Any possible channel stuffing sales can then be 
communicated between the two auditors for final evaluations. 
Finally, under delayed posting of the sales returns fraud scheme, management does not 
record returned items until the next period, which again causes overstatement of revenue and 
accounts receivables for the current period. The auditor-to-auditor confirmation should discover 
delayed posting of the sales returns fraud schemes because the customer accounts payable do not 
correspond to the accounts receivable of the client at the financial statement date and this will be 
reflected in the confirmation received. 
It should be noted that most of these fraudulent financial reporting schemes should be 
uncovered by proper accounts receivable confirmations under current professional standards. 
However, several factors affect the effectiveness of confirmations as it is currently done. First, 
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collusion between management and/or employees and their customers reduces the effectiveness 
of accounts receivable confirmations. Caster et al. (2008) report from reviewing SEC AAERs 
that over 40% of the auditees’ account receivable confirmation fraud involved such collusion. 
“Auditee management persuaded one or more of its customers to provide the auditors with false 
information, such as failing to admit to side agreements that permitted the right of return or 
represented sales on consignment, or simply agreeing to sign and confirm a balance that was 
clearly incorrect (Caster et al. 2008, 261).  
Second, the low response rate of accounts receivable confirmations also contribute to the 
effectiveness of the evidence accumulation. While auditors are supposed to perform other audit 
procedures to satisfy themselves of the existence assertion, the alternative procedures are also 
subject to manipulation by the management.   
Finally, the process of sending accounts receivable confirmations is subject to 
manipulation by the management. For example, management provides the address of the 
customers. Auditors rely on this information and send the confirmation accordingly. Auditor-to-
auditor confirmations of accounts receivable can improve these deficiencies and provide more 
reliable, effective, and timely confirmations of accounts receivable, which consequently will 
prevent major fraud schemes related to overstatement of accounts receivable and revenues. 
In addition, the format of accounts receivable confirmation should also be modified to 
allow better communication about possibility of fraud schemes between the auditors. For 
example, the confirmation can be modified to include questions about possibility of returned 
merchandize in the next period, possibility of channel stuffing, and so on. The modified format 
should provide more information to the client’s auditor to uncover potential fraud in overstating 
accounts receivable and revenues. 
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CONCLUSION AND LIMITATIONS 
 Prior research indicates that confirmations of accounts receivable are somewhat effective 
in testing for existence assertion but this effectiveness is hampered by the low response rate from 
confirmees, as well as collusion between auditee management and the confirmee. The evidence 
also suggests that confirmations of accounts receivable response rates may have fallen over time 
(Caster et al. 2008). In addition, a review of AAERs showed “a significant number of cases 
involving collusion and also forged and false confirmations, suggesting that confirmation 
evidence may not be as persuasive as it is generally perceived (Caster et al. 2008, 258).”  
 In response to these problems, the ASB and the IAASB have amended and issued new 
standards in the last few years to strengthen the confirmation process. The new amended 
standards allow for secure electronic audit confirmations with the hope that it would help 
auditors more easily detect financial frauds involving audit confirmation irregularities.  I argue 
that while the automation process may alleviate some of the problems in the confirmation 
process, it could not eliminate collusion between management and the third party. In addition, it 
may create other problems related to automation and information technologies such as receiving 
email responses from fake confirmees.  
This paper presents a new approach, Auditor-to-Auditor Confirmation (ATAC), to 
overcome the problems associated with current process of obtaining accounts receivable 
confirmations. That is, the client’s auditor will communicate with the customer’s auditor to 
obtain accounts receivable confirmations. Advantages of the ATAC approach are increase in the 
response rate for positive confirmation, higher reliability for negative confirmation, 
authentication of confirmations, and increased effectiveness and reliability of confirmations. 
While there are some road blocks to this approach, this study argues that they are minimal and 
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can be overcome for the sake of public good. In addition, this paper also suggests that the format 
of accounts receivable confirmation should be modified to allow more information to be 
obtained from auditor confirmees. 
 The new approach suggested in this study is subject to several limitations. First, the new 
ATAC approach could be more useful for public companies than private companies because 
private companies’ customers are small businesses, which may not have auditors. Second, this 
study only addresses the management fraud or financial reporting fraud related to the accounts 
receivable and revenues and not the employee fraud or misappropriation of assets. Third, this 
paper does not address the situation when management requests auditors not to send 
confirmations to the customers. However, this limitation should not be of much concern because 
the client’s auditor is not communicating with the customer but the customer’s auditors. Fourth, 
although it would be rare, it is also important to note that collusion could also happen when 
ATAC is used. For example, in the case of ESM Government Securities, the audit partner 
colluded with the company management to falsify financial statements.  Finally, this study uses 
student subjects to assess desirability of different types of accounts receivable confirmation. In 
addition to usual survey method limitations applicable to the analyses related to student 
responses, students may not be a good substitute for professionals (Peterson, 2001) and therefore, 
the results may not be generalizable to auditors. Future studies may replicate this study to see if 
the results hold with professional auditors. 
 Notwithstanding these limitations, until further technological advances such as 
Bolckchain which may eliminate the need for confirmations, ATAC can be used to minimize 
flatulent activities related to accounts receivable.  
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Table 1: Friedman Test of Three Methods of Accounts Receivable Confirmation 
Statement X
2 
p 
Response rate to positive accounts receivable confirmation 33.445 .000 
Authentication of account receivable confirmation 11.598 .003 
Efficiency of the audit of accounts receivable confirmation 33.954 .000 
Effectiveness of the audit of accounts receivable confirmation 8.373 .015 
Reliability of negative confirmation for accounts receivable 8.032 .018 
Cost to implement 16.217 .000 
Practicality to implement 16.300 .000 
Amount of alternative procedures needed when responses to 
positive accounts receivable confirmation are not received 
4.647 .098 
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Table 2: Post Hoc Friedman’s Two-Way ANOVA by Ranks 
Statement 
Mean Rank 
Asymptotic Significance  
(2-sided Test) 
PAC EAC ATAC 
PAC vs 
EAC 
PAC vs 
ATAC 
EAC vs 
ATAC 
Response rate to 
positive accounts 
receivable confirmation 
1.47 2.18 2.35 .000 .000 n.s. 
Authentication of 
account receivable 
confirmation 
1.93 1.78 2.29 n.s. n.s. .011 
Efficiency of the audit 
of accounts receivable 
confirmation 
1.50 2.40 2.10 .000 .002 n.s. 
Effectiveness of the 
audit of accounts 
receivable confirmation 
1.81 1.97 2.22 n.s. .056 n.s. 
Reliability of negative 
confirmation for 
accounts receivable 
1.84 1.92 2.23 n.s. .071 n.s. 
Cost to implement 2.12 1.54 2.24 .016 n.s. .001 
Practicality to 
implement 
1.86 2.36 1.78 .014 n.s. .003 
Amount of alternative 
procedures needed 
when responses to 
positive accounts 
receivable confirmation 
are not received 
2.15 1.95 1.90 n.s. n.s. n.s. 
PAC= Paper Audit Confirmation 
EAC= Electronic Audit Confirmation 
ATAC= Auditor-to-Auditor Confirmation 
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Appendix A 
 
Confirmation of accounts receivable is a generally accepted auditing procedure. However, 
history has shown that companies may overstate accounts receivable and subsequently 
manipulate the process of obtaining accounts receivable confirmation by the auditors. Several 
approaches can be used to obtain accounts receivable confirmation including paper mailing to 
the third party, electronic audit confirmation, and Auditor to Auditor Confirmation. The 
following statements are asking you opinion with regard to each of the approaches and are not 
necessarily what the Generally Accepted Auditing Standards is. Below is the definition of each 
approach: 
 
Paper Audit Confirmation (PAC): A procedure where the auditor mails the accounts receivable 
confirmation letter directly to the customer of the client. 
 
Electronic Audit Confirmation (EAC): A procedure where the auditor uses a third party (e.g., 
confirmation.com) to obtain accounts receivable confirmation via electronic means. 
 
Auditor to Auditor Confirmation (ATAC): A procedure where the auditor can communicate to 
each other to obtain accounts receivable confirmation. 
 
Please rate the following statements using the scale 1=strongly disagree to 7=strongly agree for 
each of the above approaches. Circle the number you believe explain the best each approaches. 
 
In your opinion, this approach           PAC            EAC            ATAC        
 will increase accounts receivable response rate  
to positive confirmation   1 2 3 4 5 6 7  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 will increase authentication of accounts  
receivable confirmation   1 2 3 4 5 6 7  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  
will increase efficiency of the audit of accounts 
 receivable     1 2 3 4 5 6 7  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 will increase effectiveness of the audit of  
accounts receivable    1 2 3 4 5 6 7  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 will increase the reliability of negative  
confirmations     1 2 3 4 5 6 7  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 is very costly to implement    1 2 3 4 5 6 7  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 is not practical to be implemented  1 2 3 4 5 6 7  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 can reduce cost of accounts receivable audit  
because of higher response rate and less  
alternative procedures needed  1 2 3 4 5 6 7  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
